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<R INCE 1971, the law on non,navigational uses of international water, o courses has been on the agenda of the International Law Commission. It 
took thirteen reports, five special rapporteurs, and 26 years before the work led 
ro the UN General Assembly's adoption, on May 21, 1997, of the Convention 
on the Law of Non,Navigational Uses oflnternational Watercourses l (1997 
Watercourses Convention). It is a "framework convention," intended to "en, 
sure the utilization, development, conservation, management, and protection 
of international watercourses, and the promotion of the optimal and sustain, 
able utilization thereof for present and future generations."2 
The convention will enter into force after at least 35 States become parties 
to it. Since it was adopted by a relatively small majority-103 in favor, 3 
against, and 27 abstentions-the prospects for such a number of participants 
are not certain. The convention is nevertheless of considerable interest, not 
least because some of its principles may constitute a codification of customary 
rules} 
Dispute Settlement under the 1997 Watercourses Convention 
Provisions on the prevention and settlement of disputes are of particular im~ 
portance in the sphere of international water agreements for at least two rea~ 
sons. First, the use of water by several riparian States has to be based on a 
certain compromise between the interests of the different parties, in particular 
in areas that suffer from water scarcity. It is a case of distributive justice. In the 
past, when watercourses served mainly or perhaps exclusively for navigation, 
the danger of conflict was minimal since the use of the river by one ship did not 
seriously hamper another vessel from sailing in its wake. Even fishing with tra~ 
ditional techniques failed to hinder fishing activities by another riparian. But 
today, with the new and expanded non~navigational uses of watercourses on 
the one hand, and the danger of pollution on the other hand, disputes among 
neighbors that share an aquifer or a drainage basin system are almost 
unavoidable. 
Second, some conventions and other texts in this field (including the one 
here under review) prescribe only general, rather flexible, principles, such as 
"equitable and reasonable utilization and participation."4The implementation 
of these general notions can easily lead to disagreement and conflict of inter~ 
ests-hence the need for conflict prevention, management, and settlement 
mechanisms. In fact, a great number of conventions and other texts dealing 
with international streams include provisions for those purposes.5 
When studying dispute resolution in the context of international water law, 
one has to bear in mind certain characteristics of this field.6 The questions and 
problems are of a rather technical nature. Moreover, there is not only a need to 
reconcile the interests of different States but also to find the right balance be~ 
tween different categories of uses.7 In addition, the uses have to be adapted to 
the requirement of protection of the environment.8 These characteristics, and 
the fact that we are dealing with a joint watercourse, imply that every solution 
has to be based on cooperation between the parties.9 These features have led a 
great number of experts to conclude that the management of international 
river systems should be entrusted to permanent joint international commis~ 
sions, which would also deal with the settlement of disputes. 10 
Before proceeding to study in detail the relevant provisions in the 1997 Wa~ 
tercourses Convention, it may be helpful to highlight its main rules: conflict 
prevention by the exchange of information, 11 consultation on equitable utiliza~ 
tion, 12 notification concerning planned measures, 13 communication in reply, 14 
and consultation. IS If, nevertheless, a conflict occurs, it should be solved by ne~ 
gotiations upon the request of one of the parties. 16 If negotiations fail, the par~ 
ties "may jointly seek the good offices of, or request mediation or conciliation 
by, a third party, or make use, as appropriate, of any joint watercourse 
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institutions that may have been established by them, or agree to submit the dis~ 
pute to arbitration, or to the International Court ofJustice."17 All these mecha~ 
nisms, except for negotiations, require the consent of both parties. If the 
dispute is not solved by one of these methods, there is an obligation, upon one 
party's request, to submit it to a Fact~finding Commission)8 The parties have 
to consider the latter's report "in good faith," but it is not binding. States may 
also agree in advance to submit disputes to the International Court ofJustice or 
to binding arbitration ("opt~in" procedure). Finally, the text includes a provi~ 
sion on private claims.19 
Dispute Prevention 
The first means of preventing disputes is the exchanging of information. 
"Watercourse states shall on a regular basis exchange readily available 
data ... "20 "If a watercourse state is requested ... to provide data ... that is not 
readily available, it shall employ its best efforts to comply with the request."21 It 
thus seems that supplying readily available data is compulsory, while transmit~ 
ting information which is not readily available is a relative obligation and may 
be subject to the payment of reasonable costs. 
Moreover, in emergency situations there is an unconditional obligation to 
notify other potentially affected States without delay.22 An emergency situa~ 
tion has been defined as "a situation that causes, or poses an imminent threat of 
causing, serious harm to watercourse states ... and that results suddenly from 
natural causes ... or from human conduct .... "23 The idea is that early knowl~ 
edge of an emergency can help potentially affected States to prevent or reduce 
the damage. For instance, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster amply demonstrated 
the harm caused by holding back information. However, States are not obli~ 
gated to provide data or information vital to their national defense and secu~ 
rity.24 
In the search for "equitable and reasonable utilization" of the watercourse, 
the parties have, "when the need arises," to "enter into consultation."25 Simi~ 
larly, if "significant harm" is caused to a State by another watercourse State, the 
latter has to take all appropriate measures, in consultation with the affected 
state, to eliminate or mitigate the harm.26 
The obligation to prevent conflict is even more developed in case of 
"planned measures" of exploitation or development projects by one State. For 
such situations, the convention establishes a series of procedures-exchange of 
information, notification, communication, consultation and, where necessary, 
negotiations; a State contemplating a new use, a change in an existing use, or 
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development projects on the watercourse that may have "a significant adverse 
effect" upon other riparians, shall provide those States with timely notification 
thereof. The notification has to be accompanied by available technical data, in~ 
cluding, most importantly, the results of any environmental impact asses~ 
ment.27 The potentially affected States are given six months-a period that 
may be extended an additional six months if it is difficult to evaluate the possi~ 
ble effects of the planned measures-to respond.28 If the relevant States do not 
respond, the State that planned the new measures may go ahead, but still has to 
comply with the principles laid down by the convention.29 
On the other hand, if the other watercourse States communicate their ob~ 
jection, the parties "shall enter into consultations and, if necessary, negotia~ 
tions with a view to arriving at an equitable resolution of the situation."30 
Another provision deals with the situation in which there is disagreement on 
whether other riparian States have to be notified of certain plans.31 Only in 
cases of "the utmost urgency in order to protect public health, public safety or 
other equally important interests" maya State proceed with planned measures 
before the necessary notifications and consultations have taken place.32 
To conclude, the convention lays down a considerable set of rules on infor~ 
mation, notification, communication, consultation and negotiations intended 
to prevent conflicts. Conflicting interests are to be adjusted by cooperative 
means. While each State has to take into consideration the needs and interests 
of the others, no right of veto has been granted to any riparian. 
The process of dispute prevention can take twelve months or even longer. If 
the matter is not resolved to the satisfaction of all the watercourse States, the 
dispute settlement procedures would have to be employed. 
Dispute Settlement 
While all the dispute prevention measures are obligatory, in the field of dis~ 
pute settlement only two mechanisms are compulsory-negotiations and sub~ 
mission to a fact~finding commission. All others are optional. 
The relevant provisions were hotly debated at the last sessions prior to adop~ 
tion of the convention, namely, in the meetings of the plenary ad hoc working 
group of the whole, which met in October 1996 and in March-April 1997. 
Some delegations favored compulsory resort to a diplomatic mechanism-im~ 
partial fact~finding, or mediation or conciliation. Should that procedure fail, 
they argued for an obligation to resort to arbitration and adjudication before 
the International Court of Justice or another competent court.33 At the other 
extreme were States that opposed any compulsory procedures.34 Between these 
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two poles were various intermediate opinions. For example, one group advo, 
cated an "opt,in" procedure, i.e., at the time of depositing the instrument of 
ratification, each party would state whether it would be bound to compulsory 
arbitration and/or compulsory adjudication before the International Court of 
J ustice.35 By contrast, the International Law Commission had recommended 
compulsory fact,finding,36 whereas Drafting Group Chairman Professor 
Lammers had favored compulsory fact,finding plus an "opt,in" procedure.37 
Some supported compulsory fact,finding plus an "opt' in" procedure plus com, 
pulsory conciliation.38 These examples show the extent to which opinions on 
the subject differed. 
The reasoning against compulsory binding third, party involvement is obvi, 
ous. Binding settlement of disputes is considered inappropriate for a framework 
convention like the 1997 Watercourses Convention, since such a convention 
only provides guidelines. In addition, one can argue that international water, 
course law is not sufficiently developed and that the existing case law is not rich 
enough to serve as the basis for adjudication by a judge or an arbitrator. More, 
over, States might balk at binding solutions because they feel such procedures 
undermine their sovereignty.39 The opinion has also been expressed that States 
should be free to choose the appropriate means of dispute settlement according 
to the nature of the dispute and the circumstances·40 
On the other hand, there are many considerations in favor of an obligatory 
binding third party mechanism. Although the text is a framework convention, 
it nevertheless contains specific obligations. If every State had the power to in, 
terpret or apply the provisions of the convention as it saw fit, the convention 
would be of little value. If disputes are not to drag on endlessly, and if might is 
not to prevail over law, settlement procedures that yield binding solutions must 
be provided for. Given the ambiguity or general nature of some of the concepts 
that are included in the convention, such as the terms "equitable," "reason, 
able," "significant," and the difficulty in determining how much weight should 
be given to each of the factors to be taken into consideration when establishing 
the equitable and reasonable utilization, the presence of a neutral third party 
with power to adopt binding decisions would be particularly valuable.41 More, 
over, the very existence of a compulsory and binding mechanism can induce 
States to compromise. 
With so many different opinions and considerations, it is little wonder that 
the relevant article-Article 33-was adopted in the Working Group by only a 
small majority: 33 in favor, 5 against, and 22 abstentions. In the discussion that 
follows, optional mechanisms whose activation under the 1997 Watercourses 
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Convention requires the consent of both parties will be addressed first. Discus, 
sion will then turn to the compulsory means that can be activated unilaterally. 
Optional Mechanisms. The list of optional procedures is quite impressive: good 
offices, mediation, conciliation, use of any joint watercourse institution, 
arbitration, submission to the International Court of Justice. 42 This list does 
not include one of the mechanisms mentioned in Article 33 of the UN Charter, 
namely, inquiry-probably because fact,finding is a compulsory means under 
the convention. On the other hand, the convention does include good offices, 
a procedure absent from the UN text. Instead of resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements mentioned in the Charter, the convention refers to the use of 
any joint watercourse institution. 
The convention has also adopted the "opt,in" procedure: when becoming a 
party to the convention or thereafter, a State may declare that in respect of any 
dispute not resolved by the above optional mechanisms, it accepts the compul, 
sory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice or of an arbitration 
panel.43 For such an arbitration, the convention has also laid down optional 
rules of procedure.44 It is interesting that the reference to arbitration and adju, 
dication has not been limited to conflicts of a legal nature. 
Under the optional rules on arbitration, a party may unilaterally submit a 
dispute to arbitration: "If the parties do not agree on the subject matter of the 
dispute, the arbitral tribunal shall determine the subject matter."45 The "sub, 
ject matter" is probably equivalent to the question submitted for arbitration.46 
The tribunal shall consist of three members. Each of the parties shall appoint 
one member, and the chairman shall be designated by common agreement. He 
may not be a national or a habitual resident of any of the parties or the other 
riparians. Vacancies shall be filled in the same manner. If either a national 
member or the chairman is not appointed within a certain time, the President 
of the International Court of Justice shall designate him at the request of a 
party.47 
The rules to be applied by the arbitrators have been defined as " ... [T] he 
provisions of this convention and internationallaw."48 Although this provision 
does not expressly mention equity, the tribunal will have to refer to it, since the 
convention itself to a large extent prOVides for "equitable and reasonable utili, 
zation and participation."49 
Unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree, the arbitral tribunal shall 
determine its own rules of procedure. 50 It may also, at the request of one of the 
parties, recommend essential interim measures of protection.51 The term "rec-
ommend" implies that these measures are optional. The parties have to 
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facilitate the work of the tribuna1.52 Both the parties and the arbitrators are un' 
der an obligation to protect the confidentiality of any information they receive 
in confidence during the proceedings.53 Usually, the expenses of the tribunal 
shall be borne by the parties in equal shares.54 
Other parties to the convention that have an interest of a legal nature in the 
subject matter may intervene in the proceedings with the consent of the tribu, 
na1.55 This provision is remarkable, since it is usually not possible for a third 
party to intervene in an arbitration. 
When dealing with a case, the tribunal may also hear counterclaims that 
arise directly out of the subject matter of the dispute.56 If a party does not par' 
ticipate in the proceedings, the tribunal may nevertheless go ahead with the 
case.57 
The tribunal should render its award within five months, but it may extend 
that period for another five months. The award should include the reasons on 
which it is based, and members may add separate as well as dissenting opinions. 
There lies no appeal against the award unless the parties have agreed in ad, 
vance to an appellate procedure. Either party may apply to the tribunal if a con' 
troversy arises with regard to the interpretation or manner of implementation 
of the award.58 
The convention leaves the choice among the optional mechanisms to the 
parties without recommending a particular procedure for certain kinds of dis, 
putes. What are, then, the circumstances to be considered when deciding 
which procedure should be preferred? One should ascertain the nature of the 
dispute-whether it is a political or a legal one, namely, whether the parties are 
at odds over their existing rights or over changes to be introduced in those 
rights. Second, do the parties disagree on questions of fact, or oflaw, or both? 
Third, is the dispute mainly of a technical nature? Fourth, the general relations 
between the parties have to be taken into consideration. Fifth, does the dispute 
involve vital interests of a State? Indeed, most States would be reluctant to sub, 
mit such a dispute to binding third party adjudication. Sixth, should one try to 
solve the dispute by an ad hoc mechanism, or is it preferable to establish a per' 
manent institution that can from time to time adjust the rights of the parties to 
accord with changing circumstances?59 
Examining the conflict in accordance with the above criteria will help the 
parties to choose the best suited mechanism. If, however, the disagreement is 
not settled by one of the optional methods, the obligatory measures remain: ne, 
gotiation and a fact,finding commission. 
Negotiation is the most natural and commonly used way to settle a dispute. 
It is a process which allows the parties to fully retain control over the dispute 
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and its resolution. It would be beyond the scope of this article to analyze various 
mechanisms of negotiation. 60 One should, however, bear in mind that negotia, 
tions can be successful only if all the participants wish to reach an agreement 
and are ready to compromise. Especially in water, related issues, there is usually 
a great need for compromise. 
Compulsory Means. If the parties cannot solve their dispute by a means of their 
choice or by negotiations, it shall be submitted, at the request of any of the 
parties to the dispute, to impartial fact,finding.61 When the exhaustion of 
negotiations is a prerequisite for resorting to another means of dispute 
settlement, it is not easy to establish when and whether the possibilities for a 
negotiated settlement have been exhausted. The 1997 Watercourses 
Convention has established an objective criterion related to time: "[I] f after six 
months from the time of the request for negotiations ... the Parties concerned 
have not been able to settle their dispute through negotiations or any other 
means ... the dispute shall be submitted, at the request of any of the parties to 
the dispute, to impartial fact,finding.,,62 I assume the same applies if a party 
refuses to negotiate, despite its obligation. Interestingly, the six months are 
counted from the date of the "request for negotiations" and not from the time 
the negotiations have actually started. 
The text lays down a certain number of rules for the fact,finding mecha, 
nism: the commission is to be composed of one member appointed by each of 
the parties to the dispute, and a third person chosen by the two members nomi, 
nated by the patties. The third member may not have the nationality of either 
party and he will serve as chairman.63 In order to prevent frustration of the pro' 
cess by failure to agree on a chairman, the text provides that if within three 
months of the request for the establishment of the commission the chairman 
has not been chosen, the Secretary,General of the United Nations will appoint 
him. Moreover, the convention even foresees the possibility that a party may 
refuse to appoint its own member-a situation that has happened in the past 
when a party wished to avoid an arbitration to which it was committed.64 In 
that case, under the Watercourses Convention, the Secretary,General of the 
UN will appoint a person who does not have the nationality of the parties to 
the dispute nor of any riparian State of the watercourse concerned, and this 
person will constitute "a single,member commission."65 
However constituted, the commission shall determine its own procedure.66 
The parties have to provide the commission with information that it may re, 
quire, and permit it to visit their respective territories to inspect relevant struc, 
tures and equipment as well as natural features.67 
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The commission shall adopt its report by a majority vote, unless it is a sin~ 
gle~member commission, and submit it to the parties. The report should set 
forth "its findings and the reasons therefore and such recommendations as it 
deems appropriate for an equitable solution of the dispute."68 Probably, the 
"equitable solution" does not necessarily have to be in accordance with the-Ie~ 
gal situation. The parties do not have to adopt the report and implement it, but 
they must consider it "in good faith."69 
In order to better understand and evaluate the procedure established as 
obligatory by the convention, it may be worthwhile to examine the notion of 
fact~finding in international law. The forerunner of fact~finding was the insti~ 
tution of inquiry, established by the 1899 and 1907 Convention on the Peace~ 
ful Settlement of International Disputes.10 The great affinity between these 
two concepts has also been recognized by the International Bureau of the Per~ 
manent Court of Arbitration: the revised rules on the subject established by the 
International Bureau, which entered into force in 1997, are called "Optional 
Rules for Fact~Finding Commissions of Inquiry." According to the introduc~ 
tion to the text, "the denomination 'Fact~finding Commission ofInquiry' satis~ 
fies the need for modernization .... "71 
Most international disputes include, inter alia, disagreement over facts. A 
disinterested third party that tries to solve the dispute, whether it is a concilia~ 
tion commission, arbitral tribunal, court of justice, or United Nations organ, 
has to resolve the issue of fact by an inquiry. A commission of inquiry or 
fact~finding panel, on the other hand, is an institutional arrangement intended 
to clarify only a specific point of fact. This mechanism is based on the assump~ 
tion that if the factual disagreement is solved by an authoritative impartial 
third party, the solution of the dispute is self~evident. 
The case of the Tiger, a Norwegian ship sunk in 1917 by a German subma~ 
rine off the coast of Spain, serves as an example. Both Norway and Spain were 
neutral in that war, but the Norwegian vessel allegedly carried contraband. 
The crucial question was the vessel's location; Spain claimed that the attack 
had taken place in her waters (and hence was illegal), while Germany main~ 
tained that it had taken place on the high seas (and hence was lawful). The 
commission of inquiry had difficulties in ascertaining where the attack had ac~ 
tually taken place, but in the end concluded that it had happened in Spanish 
waters.72 The obvious conclusion was that the act was unlawful; however, the 
commission did not have to deal with the issue oflegality, but only with the fac~ 
tual question. 
The specific procedure established by the Hague Convention has been fol~ 
lowed in only very few cases (about six), but other fact~finding mechanisms 
239 
Dispute Settlement under the 1997 Watercourses Convention 
have been used on an ad hoc basis by various international organizations. The 
League of Nations set up its own commissions of inquiry in seven cases, inelud, 
ing the Aland Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden in 1921, and the 
Mosul dispute between Britain and Turkey in 1925. The United Nations has 
similarly resorted to inquiry. For instance, in 1982 the Security Council estab, 
lished a fact, finding commission to investigate an attempted coup led by for, 
eign mercenaries in the Seychelles, and in 1984 Secretary General Perez de 
Cuellar sent a commission of neutral experts to investigate whether chemical 
weapons had been used in the Iran,Iraq war. Moreover, the UN General As, 
sembly has expressly recommended the resort to fact, finding as a means to set, 
de disputes. 73 
Also well known are the International Labor Organization's commissions of 
fact, finding, which investigate complaints related to labor conventions. 
Among the commissions established by the International Civil Aviation Orga, 
nization, the most famous is the one established in 1983 to investigate the 
KAL 007 incident, which involved the shooting down of a South Korean 
jumbo jet over Soviet territory}4 
A permanent international fact' finding commission was established by the 
parties to the 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Con, 
flicts. 75 The provision on fact, finding became operative in 1990 after 20 States 
had expressed consent to the jurisdiction of the commission}6The commission 
is to 
(i) enquire into any facts alleged to be a grave breach as defined in the 
Conventions and this Protocol or other serious violation of the Conventions 
or of this Protocol; 
(ii) facilitate, through its good offices, the restoration of an attitude of respect for 
the Conventions and this Protocol.77 
Although the text of the Protocol does not say so expressly, according to the 
Commentary prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross the 
commission is authorized to enquire only into the facts and not to decide mat, 
ters oflaw or pass judgment.78 
So far we have seen that by definition the mechanism of inquiry or 
fact, finding is limited to the establishment of the facts. However, under the 
1997 Watercourses Convention as quoted above, the commission is also to in, 
elude in its report "recommendations as it deems appropriate for an equitable 
solution of the dispute."79 Is this still in the realm of fact,finding? It seems that 
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although the commission envisaged by the convention is a fact~finding one, it 
also has some ingredients of conciliation (a formal impartial commission to in~ 
vestigate a dispute and to suggest possible ways to settle it). Moreover, a study 
of the various precedents shows that in certain other instances fact~finding 
commissions have submitted reports that actually included conclusions that 
went beyond mere fact~finding.80 
Like all other diplomatic means for the settlement of disputes, fact~finding 
does not lead to a binding decision. However, under the 1997 Watercourses 
Convention, the parties have an obligation to consider the report in good faith. 
That is probably a general obligation which applies even in cases in which it is 
not expressly mentioned. 
The text includes only a few guidelines as to how the commission should 
proceed, and authorizes it to determine its own procedure. There are certain 
rules which may be helpful for any fact~finding organ: 
A fact~finding mission should not begin its quest without clearly defined terms of 
reference that circumscribe the precise area in which it is to operate. These terms 
of reference should be neutrally stated in the form of questions of fact. The 
mission should insist that within this area it be free to apply the best available 
tools of perceptive objectivity, insulated from socio~political passions and 
assumptions. Ordinarily, the members should be distinguished individuals not 
beholden to governments-certainly not to governments with a direct stake in 
the issues. Appointment to a fact~finding panel should be irrevocable until the 
completion of the mission. Evidence should be taken in such a way as to facilitate 
informed cross-examination and rebuttal, and at the same time to protect 
witnesses against reprisal. The panel should have its own staff capable of 
researching issues as well as preparing agendas and itineraries independently. 
The fact-finders' on-site freedom of movement and access should be assured ab 
initio. Draft findings should be circulated to the parties for comment. The final 
product should accurately reflect the result, whether it is a consensus, a majority, 
or a wide diversity of views as to the facts. Members should be free to write 
separate or dissenting reports.81 
Private Remedies 
So far we have dealt with the prevention and solution of inter~state con~ 
flicts. The 1997 Watercourses Convention also deals to some extent with pri~ 
vate remedies. Under Article 32, entitled, "Non~discrimination," natural as 
well as juridical persons who have suffered or may suffer significant 
transboundary harm as a result of activities related to an international water~ 
course, should be granted equal access to, and non~discriminatory treatment 
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at, judicial or other (probably administrative) procedures in the State where 
the harmful activity was carried out. No discrimination on the basis of the na~ 
tionality or residence of the claimant, nor in view of the place where the injury 
occurred, is permitted. The watercourse States concerned may, however, agree 
to provide otherwise for the interests of the relevant persons. 
T he 1997 Watercourses Convention has provided for conflict preven~ tion and for dispute resolution. States must endeavor to prevent con~ 
flicts by the exchange of information, notification, communication, 
consultation, and, where necessary, negotiations. These means of prevention 
are obligatory. 
On the other hand, in the field of dispute settlement, some mechanisms are 
optional: good offices, mediation, conciliation, the use of a watercourse institu~ 
tion, arbitration, or the International Court of} ustice. Only two procedures are 
obligatory: negotiation and establishment of a fact~finding commission. Even 
though resort to the latter two mechanisms is obligatory, the outcome is not 
binding. 
In dealing with water~related issues, the parties to the dispute as well as 
those helping them to solve it should bear in mind some special features of this 
area. There may be a conflict not only between the interests of riparians for a 
similar use of the water, e.g., the allocation of water for irrigation, but there 
may also be a need to reconcile different uses of the water, e.g., agricultural ver~ 
sus industrial ones.82 Other matters, not directly related to the distribution of 
benefits, may have to be envisaged, in particular the protection of the environ~ 
ment and the interests of future generations.83 Considerations of efficiency may 
have to be weighed against the need for equitable solutions, as well as the 
search for "equitable and reasonable utilization and participation" against the 
"obligation not to cause significant harm."84 Moreover, one has to remember 
that with regard to water, there may exist psychological factors, as well as reli~ 
gious sensitivities.85 
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